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ABSTRACTS

Criminal Law-Comment on a Defendant's Failure to Testify
Defendant was charged with breaking and entering with intent
to commit a misdemeanor. The prosecutor, in his argument to the
jury, stated that "iYs uncontroverted' ...that (this defendant) told
him2 right there... that (he) committed this crime." Defendant
was convicted as charged. Held, reversed. Comment by the prosecuting attorney that evidence against defendant was "uncontroverted" was reversible error where defendant did not testify.
Mims v. Florida, 192 So.2d 62 (Fla. 1966).
The Mims decision raises the question of what constitutes a
comment on the constitutional right of an accused to remain silent
and to have no inference of guilt raised by this silence. This
problem was recently considered in the 1965 decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Griffin v. California.' The court held that
the self-incrimination guaranty of the fifth amendment, which
applies to state actions through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment,4 "forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the court that such
silence is evidence of guilt."s
Even prior to the decision of the Court in Griffin the right of an
accused to remain silent in a federal prosecution and to be assured
that such silence will not be the subject of comment had long
been upheld.' The protection of this right has, in fact, been
explicitly provided for in the federal statutes! Early federal decisions were based on these statutes, and the question of whether
the fifth amendment prohibited comment on the silence of an
accused was not finally decided by the Court until the 1965 Griffin
decision. There were, however, occasions for the Court to discuss
this question in earlier decisions. In the 1937 case of Adamson v.
California,' a majority of the Court seemed to accept, in dicta, the
proposition that the fifth amendment would prohibit comment by
a prosecutor in a federal case.
' Emphasis added.
2
esting police detective.
'380 U.S. 609 (1964).
4Malloy

v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
6 Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60 (1893).
7 18 U.S.C. § 348 (1948).
8332 U.S. 46 (1943).
5Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
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Most of the states have also accepted the proposition that comment by the prosecution, on the failure of an accused to testify,
should not be allowed in the American system of criminal justice.
At the time of the Griffin decision only five states permitted such
comment.' Prior to that decision, but subsequent to the fifth
amendment being applied to the states in Malloy v. Hogan,'" New
Jersey, which had permitted comment prior to Malloy, decided
that to allow it violated the fifth and fourteenth amendments."
Since 1965, when the Griffin decision was handed down, the law
in the United States has been to the effect that comment on the
silence of an accused is not to be permitted. The only remaining
question was what constituted such comment. In the principal
case, the mere statement that the testimony of the arresting officer
was "uncontroverted" was admitted by the state to be prohibited
comment and error, and the conviction was reversed on that basis.
Whether such a statement would be considered a comment on
the silence of an accused in West Virginia is doubtful. The applicable statute' 2 in West Virginia provides that the failure of the
accused "to testify shall create no presumption against him nor be
the subject of any comment before the court or jury.. . " Comment
on the failure of an accused to testify has been held to be ground
for annulling the trial unless waived,' 3 to be reversible error if
permitted over the defendant's objection," and to entitle defendant to a new trial.'" However, the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals has held in numerous instances that references to the
failure of an accused to testify are not the type of comment prohibited by the statute. In one case,' 6 the statement by the prosecuting attorney that "not a single witness has (controverted)
those facts. . . ." without specifically alluding to defendant's
failure to testify, was held not to be within the inhibition of the
statute. In a later case,' 7 a statement by the prosecutor that none
9 California, Ohio, Iowa, Connecticut, and New Mexico. Griffin v. California: Comment on Accused's Failure to Testify Prohibited by the Fifth
Amendment, 70 DICaINsoN L. REv. 98.
10378 U.S. 1 (1964).
"1State v. Murphy, 85 N.J. Super. 391, 204 A.2d 888 (1964).
,2 W. VA. CODE, ch. 57, art. 3, § 6 (Michie 1966).
"State v. Chisnel, 36 W. Va. 659, 667, 15 S.E. 412 (1892).
4 State v. Costa, 101 W. Va. 466, 132 S.E. 869 (1926).
" State v. Self, 130 W. Va. 515, 44 S.E.2d 582 (1947).
16 State v. Nazel, 109 W. Va. 617, 156 S.E. 45 (1930).
'7 State v. Simon, 132 W. Va. 322, 342, 52 S.E.2d 725 (1949).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol69/iss3/18

2

King: Abstracts of Recent Cases
1967]

CASE COMMENTS

of the testimony on which the state relied had been denied, the
defendant not having testified, was held not to amount to comment
inhibited by the statute.
The federal courts, in construing the federal statute which prohibits comment on the accused's failure to testify,'8 would seem to
more closely follow the interpretation of the West Virginia court,
as opposed to the view of the Florida court, exemplified by the
principal case. In one case, a statement by a prosecuting attorney
that certain evidence was not denied was held not to be a violation
of the applicable statute prohibiting comment on the defendant's
failure to take the stand.' 9 A federal court has also held that an
attorney's argument that the evidence against defendants was not
contradicted was not objectionable as comment on the failure of
defendants to testify."0
Thus, it would appear that the criteria for prohibitive comment
varies among the jurisdictions. In the principal case there was an
indirect and implied reference to the accused's failure to testify
held as comment prohibited in that jurisdiction. Other cases in
Florida are in accord. Indications are, however, that neither the
West Virginia court nor the federal courts would go that far, and
that a more direct comment on an accused's silence will be required
before it will be deemed of the type prohibited.

Torts-Failure to Fasten Seat Belts Not Contributory Negligence
P was injured while a passenger in an automobile driven by D
which was involved in an accident. P sued D for these injuries,
and recovered. D appealed from the judgement, maintaining that
P's failure to fasten her seat belt constituted contributory negligence. Held, affirmed. There being do duty on an automobile
passenger to use seat belts, the refusal to permit D to offer evidence
of P's failure to use them was not error. It was not within the
189 18 U.S.C. § 48 (1948).
Baker v. United States, 115 F.2d 533 (8th Cir., 1940) cert. denied,

312 U.S. 692 (1941), rehearing denied, 312 U.S. 715 (1941), rehearing
denied,
2 0 325 U.S. 894 (1945).
Bradley v. United States, 254 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1918).
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province of the court to legislate on this matter. Brown v. Kendrick,
192 So.2d 49 (Fla. 1966).
This case exemplifies an area of increasing litigation. Much
attention has been given recently to problems of highway safety.
Many states have adopted legislation in this area, with particular
emphasis being given to safety devices in automobiles. Considerable controversy has also arisen with regard to some of these
measures, and in some areas, such as regarding the use of seat
belts, there remains a need for clarification by the legislatures.
Although a great number of states have adopted statutes which
require installation of seat belts of certain approved types, only one
state has yet gone so far as to require them to be used.' In the
jurisdiction in which the principal case was decided, a statute
exists which only requires approval of the type of seat belt to be
used, if they are used.'
West Virginia has deemed it appropriate to adopt legislation in
regard to this matter. Our statute' is also limited in scope, however,
and requires only that "no dealer . . . shall sell, lease, transfer or
trade, at retail, any passenger automobile which is manufactured
after (January 1, 1965), unless such vehicle is equipped with safety
seat belts for the front seat . . . " This statute applies only to
passenger automobiles and only requires installation in the front
seats of such vehicles.
It appears that if the use of seat belts is accepted as having a
beneficial effect with regard to promotion of highway safety, and
there are many studies so indicating, the West Virginia statute is
defective. Indeed, it seems that the West Virginia Legislature
was, in adopting this statute, impliedly accepting the proposition
that the use of seat belts4 has a beneficial effect in regard to the
number and the severity of injuries resulting from traffic accidents.
For the Legislature to accept this proposition, and then to require
only that seat belts be installed in the front seat of passenger
IRhode Island has a statute requiring their use by drivers of public
service vehicles. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. tit. 31, ch. 23, § 4 (Supp. 1967).
2 FLA. STAT. ANN . ch. 317, § 951 (Supp. 1967).
3 W. VA. CoDE ch. 17C, art. 15, § 43 (Michie 1966).
4 The W. Va. statute does not require the seat belts to be used.
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automobiles, certainly raises questions regarding the adoption of
the statute.
As is indicated above, the states which have adopted statutes
regarding seat belts have, with one limited exception, only required
their installation, as did West Virginia. But mere installation of
seat belts does not prevent death or injury. As was stated in a
recent article, "the legislatures have not proceeded far enough."'
"The legislatures, for the public good, should exercise their powers
to make the use of seat belts mandatory."6 If this is done, there
will be no such problems as existed in the principal case, concerning whether or not there is a duty, in the absence of statute, to
make use of seat belts which have been installed.

Trusts-Allocation of Stock Distributed to Principal
A recent case involved a proceeding to determine whether shares
of common stock distributed by a holding company pursuant to
an antitrust divestiture decree should be allocated to the principal
or income of a testamentary trust. The lower court allocated the
shares to principal. The life tenant appealed. Held: Affirmed.
Distribution of stock pursuant to an antitrust divestiture decree was
properly treated as partial liquidation within the meaning of
statutory provisions that such distributions should be allocated to
the principal of a trust rather than to the income. In re Anthony,
223 A.2d 857 (Pa. 1966).
The court in deciding the principal case applied the Pennsylvania version of the Uniform Principal and Income Act (referred to
hereafter as the Uniform Act). However, neither the Pennsylvania
statute, known as the Principal and Income Act of 1947' nor the
Uniform Act, anticipates or deals specifically with the allocation
problem presented in the principal case. The Pennsylvania court,
therefore, looked to the Revised Uniform Principal and Income
Act (hereafter referred to as the Revised Uniform Act), which,
-6

REv. 152 (1965).
ANN. tit. 20 § 3470.1-3470.15 (1964).

14 DEPAUL L.

1bid.

I PA. STAT.
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although not adopted in Pennsylvania, provides, a clarified procedure for treating divestiture distributions, 2 and for their allocation to principal. By so doing, and by expressly giving great weight
to the provisions of the Revised Uniform Act, the court concluded
that the distribution of stock in the principal case was in the
nature of a partial liquidation and was to be allocated to principal.
In a case3 involving a similar problem, a New Jersey court, in
1966, also held that shares distributed under a divestiture decree
were to be allocated to principal. The applicable statute there was
patterned after the Uniform Principal and Income Act and did
not contain the provision of the Revised Uniform Act which
specifically addresses itself to the situation faced by the court.
Although the court reached the same conclusion as would have been
reached under the Revised Uniform Act, it was only after extensive
consideration and rationalization that it was able to do so.
Had the Revised Uniform Act been in force when the principal
case and the cited New Jersey case were decided, the courts would
have been able to base their decisions upon that Act, thereby reaching the same conclusions more easily.
Should this situation arise in West Virginia, our court would be
faced with the same problem as was the court in the principal
case, in that we have only the Uniform Act, which does not make
specific provision for corporate distributions in compliance with
divestiture decrees.' In order to preclude a problem of the nature
2 Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act, § 6(b) (3) which provides,
in part
(b) Except to the extent that the corporation indicates that some part
of a corporate distribution is a settlement of preferred or guaranteed dividends
accrued since the trustee became a stockholder or is in lieu of an ordinary
cash dividend, a corporate distribution is principal if the distribution is
pursuant to
(3) a total or partial liquidation of the corporation, including any
distribution which the corporation indicates is a distribution in total or partial
liquidation or any distribution of assets.
34 In re Conway, 224 A.2d 7 (N.J. 1966).
W. Va. Code, ch. 36, art. 6, § 1-17 (Michie 1966). 36-6-5(3) provides as follows:
(4) Where the assets of a corporation are liquidated, amounts paid
upon corporate shares as cash dividends declared before such liquidation
occurred or as arrears of preferred or guaranteed dividends shall be deemed
income; all other amounts paid upon corporate shares on disbursement of
the corporate assets to the stockholders shall be deemed principal. All disbursements of corporate assets to the stockholders, whenever made, which
are designated by the corporation as a return of capital or division of corporate property shall be deemed principal.
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discussed above from arising in West Virginia, it would seem
desirable that consideration be given by our legislature to possible
adoption of the applicable provisions of the Revised Uniform Act.
Robert Bruce King
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